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The decision to go public is one of the most important decisions made by a small firm. In 
making that decision, the small firm transforms its operations from the private arena to one of 
public scrutiny (Certo 2003). A public offering provides the firm with access to the capital 
needed to finance future growth (Martin 2001; Ou & Haynes 2006). An initial public offering 
(IPO) also increases future possibilities to access debt capital (Cressy & Olofsson 1997). The 
dependence of all firms on capital for growth is unquestioned, but the changes that are 
imposed on small firm governance, as a result of the decision to go public, have received only 
limited attention. Historically, most studies of IPOs have been dominated by traditional 
finance researchers focused on the existence of underpricing and long-run underperformance 
of IPOs (Carter et al. 1998). However, given the importance of access to finance for small 
growth firms, there has been increasing interest among small business researchers in 
examining the IPO from a small business or entrepreneurship perspective (e.g. St-Pierre 
2000; Certo et al. 2001a; Certo et al. 2001b; Ou & Haynes 2006; Carpentier et al. 2008; 
Westerman et al. 2008; Zimmerman 2008). Zimmerman (2008) highlighted the importance of 
the firm’s top management team in completing a successful IPO. Westerman et al. (2008) 
found that venture capitalist backing and stock options for employees had a positive effect on 
new stock price performance. It would appear that the governance structure of the firm at the 
time of the IPO, e.g. experienced directors and managers or venture capital involvement, 
reassures investors who have a limited depth of information about the firm. Most studies of 
IPOs with small firm focus are concerned with efforts to reduce information asymmetry 
between the firm and future investors (Daily et al. 2003). Board structure and experienced 
board membership may substitute for information access, which removes some of the 
problems inherent in information asymmetry at the time of the offering (Certo et al. 2001a, 
Certo et al. 2001b). 
When transitioning from private to public ownership, corporations make substantial 
efforts to meet regulatory requirements as well as the expectations of new investors 
(Filatotchev & Bishop 2002; Howton 2006; Certo et al. 2009; Bruton et al. 2010). Most of the 
structural changes in a firm going public are related to corporate governance in general and 
the board of directors in particular (Certo et al. 2001b; Filatotchev & Bishop 2002; Baker & 
Gompers 2003; Burton et al. 2004). The role of the board, and the firm’s utilisation of it, 
changes throughout the life cycle of the firm (Lynall et al. 2003; Cornelius 2005). The 
owners’ ability to adapt the board of directors to different types of transitions, such as an IPO, 
could be vital for financial success but the different competencies needed are not necessarily 
found within the same boards (Söderström 2003). Many researchers have stressed that the 
structure of the board is a key factor influencing board performance and consequently firm 
performance (e.g. Daily & Dalton 1992; Gertner & Kaplan 1996; Certo et al. 2001a; Howton 
2006). However, there is no consensus on an optimal board structure among researchers or 
practitioners (Gertner & Kaplan 1996). Empirical research has given inconclusive and mixed 
results. In this study board structure is extended through the concept of director experience. 
Specific aspects of experience among the board of directors are examined in relation to 
aftermarket performance of an IPO; that is, underpricing/initial returns and long-run market 
performance.   
An IPO represents an important milestone in a firm’s life cycle, not only changing the 
capital structure but also bringing increased attention to the firm. The firm must also conform 
to additional regulations and practices as they move over the threshold from being a private 
entity to a public one, especially in terms of governance structures (Filatotchev & Bishop 
2002). They generally transition as well from entrepreneurial to professional operating 
strategies (Daily & Dalton 1992; Filatotchev 2006). During the complex process of public 
listing, management is often pre-occupied with non-operational issues for which they are 





often unprepared. In this case a carefully selected and experienced board of directors can be 
of great assistance to management and ensure a successful listing as well as future high levels 
of performance (Certo et al. 2001a; Baker & Gompers 2003; Hartzell et al. 2004). Despite the 
importance credited to an understanding of governance activities in “threshold” firms, 
research in this field is still in its infancy (as was stated already in 2006 by Filatotchev). 
Previous research on boards of directors and their effect on performance has examined 
insider/outsider ratios, board size, equity compensation, and other easily accessible factors. 
The findings have been contradictory both in regard to the effect on performance and on 
organisational outcomes. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) showed that firms 
appointing outside directors experience an increase in market value while Bhagat and Black 
(2001) found that firms with more independent boards do not outperform other firms. 
Filatotchev (2006) reviewed research in this area and concluded that in order to bring the 
subject of governance and IPOs forward, board experience (and power) should be linked to 
organisational outcomes or performance. This possible link between board experience and the 
aftermarket performance of IPOs will be examined herein. 
Even though stock pricing patterns following an IPO have proven to be similar all over 
Europe (Schuster 2003), we have chosen the Swedish market, as it provides us with several 
research advantages. The Swedish market offers a great opportunity to study an environment 
that includes a large proportion of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Even though 
SMEs make up most of the corporations throughout the world they have been neglected in 
previous studies (Cai et al. 2006). Manually collected data regarding boards and stock prices 
of corporations listing on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMX) between January 1996 and 
September 2006 have been examined. The OMX consisted of 791 corporations with an 
average capitalisation of €1,076 million (total capitalisation €851,459 million) in 2006 
compared to the 2,281 corporations listed on the NYSE with an average capitalisation of 
€5,217 million (total capitalisation €11,900,885 million) (EurIPO Factbook 2007). The 
average capitalisation of listed corporations on the OMX, being considerably lower than for 
corporations listed on the NYSE, is, however, similar to those listed on NASDAQ where the 
average capitalisation in 2006 was €952 million (EurIPO Factbook 2007).  
In addition, the Swedish market is rather unique in the availability of material for study, 
which allows us to test more variables than examined by previous researchers—several of 
which have been completely untested in relation to aftermarket performance. The Swedish 
system of corporate governance combines the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives in a 
unique way (Kaplan 1998; Brunninge et al. 2007; Thorsell and Cornelius 2009) through the 
combination of shareholder wealth maximisation and independent boards with employee 
representation. Furthermore, the Swedish market model, regulated by both government 
legislative initiatives and the Stock Exchange, forces Swedish firms to comply with what is, 
in the rest of Europe, classified as voluntary best practice in codes of corporate governance 
(Kiel & Nicholson 2003).3 The shareholder model is otherwise usually found in Anglo-Saxon 
countries while the stakeholder model is more commonly applied within Europe.  
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Firstly, the pricing and performance of 
IPOs is discussed, which leads into the hypotheses. The concept of director experience is then 
examined and defined for the purpose of this article. Director experience is divided into three 
classes: external ties, intra-corporate experience and specific experience. The data are then 
presented and analysed, followed by conclusions where the implications of this research and 
suggestions for further research are discussed.  
  
                                                 
3 For example, the CEO is not allowed to serve as the chairperson of the board, a minimum number (50%) of 
outsiders is required and all members of the board are required to undertake listing training before an IPO. In 
addition, the top management team can only be represented by one director. 





Pricing and Aftermarket Performance of IPOs  
As a corporation listing for the first time is new to the market there is less historical 
information about the corporation available to the public than there is for listed corporations. 
As a consequence, a certain amount of underpricing of initial public offerings is typically 
expected by investors (Jain & Kini 1994). It has been suggested that some owners “window-
dress” corporations before listing, making them appear more profitable than they actually are 
to compensate for underpricing. Firms may also inflate the offering price by timing the IPO 
in a period following unusually good performance (Jain & Kini 1994). Both “window-
dressing” and selective timing of an IPO can lead investors to overestimate pre-IPO 
performance and underestimate post-IPO performance. It has additionally been suggested that 
heterogeneous expectations among future shareholders, together with a limited supply of 
shares, could cause increased underpricing (Gouldey 2006).  
Pricing irregularities as well as differences in long term market performance between 
newly listed and listed corporations have been found in previous empirical research on IPOs 
(Ritter 1991; Howton et al. 2001; Florin & Simsek 2007; Certo et al. 2009). Howton et al. 
(2001), among others, reviewed the research in this area and concluded that on average IPOs 
outperform the market initially but underperform in total during the first three to four years 
after listing. Initial underpricing, defined as the extent to which the closing price at the first 
day of trading differs from the offer price, leads to money being “left on the table” by initial 
shareholders to the benefit of new shareholders. In addition, the corporation is deprived of 
funds that could have been utilised within it to ensure future revenues. Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002) concluded that certain governance related ‘signals’, such as retained share 
ownership by sellers and a board membership that reduces investor anxiety can be used to 
reduce the extent of underpricing. Experienced board members may lower perceived risks 
investors attribute to the increased likelihood of agency problems due to the often large 
reduction of management ownership and block holdings with a subsequent increase in the 
proportion of minority owners.  
As a result of information asymmetries and the risk of long-run underperformance, IPO 
firms seek ways to signal quality to the market (Certo et al. 2001a; Bruton et al. 2010). 
Lawless et al. (1998) stated that the most credible quality information regarding the firm’s 
future performance potential is the management (including the board of directors) of the 
corporation. An experienced board is essential for the performance of the corporation; at the 
very least it should send a signal to the shareholders and investors of capability and 
professionalism which would reduce investor uncertainty and consequently increase their 
valuation of the company. Certo et al. (2001a) argued that the quality of the board is an 
observable characteristic of the IPO firm, and one where high quality is difficult for 
corporations of lesser quality to imitate. Directors have their reputations as expert decision 
makers to protect, which makes them unwilling to participate on the boards of lower quality 
firms (Fama & Jensen 1983). As argued by Certo et al. (2001a) and Higgins and Gulati 
(2003) the board can thus be used as a signal to investors that the firm is structured for high 
performance. Certo et al. (2001a) stated that if there is a value in having an independent 
board this should be reflected in the value of the firm’s offering price at the time of the IPO. 
The same argument can be made for other characteristics associated with the board of 
directors. Hence, if the experience of the directors contributes to the performance of the firm, 
firms with more experienced directors should be able to sell their shares with less 
underpricing than firms with less experienced directors. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The more experience found among the directors of the IPO firm the less 
underpricing of the IPO. 





The long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs has also been subject to debate and, as 
mentioned above, newly listed corporations tend to underperform in the long run compared to 
already listed firms (Ritter 1991). Underperformance has been found to vary depending on 
industry and the period when the corporation is taken public (Ritter 1991). The long-run 
underperformance of IPO firms is most likely due to the market’s inability to correctly 
evaluate future earnings of previously unlisted firms (Loughran & Ritter 1995), or to 
managerial mismanagement due to increased agency problems (Howton et al. 2001). As 
argued above, a more experienced board should be able to create a stronger long-run 
aftermarket performance than a less experienced one, hence our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The more experience found among the directors of the IPO firm the better 
the long-run aftermarket performance. 
Director Experience  
The influence of the experience of directors on firm performance is sparsely considered in 
previous research. This is probably due to issues of measurability and a shortage of available 
data. Most researchers focusing on experience in the field of governance have investigated 
experience in conjunction with the top management team, particularly the CEO. For instance, 
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) found executive power and previous experience of executives 
to have a direct effect on board diversity and non-executive share ownership. They defined 
experience as management positions and board memberships held over the last five years 
before the IPO. The expertise of the board per se was investigated in conjunction with the 
size of the IPO by Finkle (1998) who concluded that the two were positively related. In that 
study, experience was measured through board size, directors’ reputation as university 
scientists, directors’ financial expertise, and directors representing venture capital firms or 
prestigious underwriters.  
The analysis described above, undertaken by Filatotchev and Bishop (2002), generated 
low R-square values. This is also common in other studies examining the effect of various 
governance mechanisms on different measures of performance (Certo et al. 2001a; Bhabra & 
Pettway 2003). The low values found in previous studies suggest that much remains for 
further examination. Many factors that may potentially impact firm performance remain to be 
tested. Filatotchev (2002) suggested that the concept of experience needs to be widened. 
Because board experience was sparsely considered in previous research, we have drawn upon 
knowledge from multiple disciplines to widen this concept, as can be seen below. Herein, the 
concept of director experience has been extended through measurement of external ties 
(interlocking directorships), intra-corporate experience (founder influence, board tenure and 
employee representation), and the specific experience of directors (managerial experience, 
age and venture capitalist involvement).  
External Ties 
External ties, such as interlocking directorships, are often discussed under resource 
dependency theory. Interaction with the external environment is essential to access valuable 
resources, especially for smaller firms (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Borch & Huse 1993). 
Interaction can be, and often is, achieved through the hiring of directors who are also active 
on other boards. These interlocking directorships provide the firm with information and 
resources not otherwise available (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Filatotchev & Bishop 2002) as 
well as providing legitimacy to the corporation (Huse 2001), which is particularly important 
for new and small firms. When a director holds interlocking directorships it is a signal that 
the person is competent, credible and trustworthy (Certo et al. 2001a). Because the reputation 





of directors serving on firms experiencing financial distress suffers, they are unlikely to 
willingly lend their name to and participate on the board of an IPO firm without having done 
their own assessment of the firm’s quality. Those who err in this judgment are consequently 
offered fewer board positions in the future (Gilson 1990). The market can, therefore, draw a 
reasonable inference about the quality of the IPO from the reputation of the directors 
associated with the firm. Certo et al. (2001a) also concluded that higher reputations among 
directors are associated with less underpricing. Interlocking directorships should thus lead to 
less underpricing and better long-term aftermarket performance.   
Intra-Corporate Experience 
Founders. The founder of a corporation has significant insight into the firm’s operations as 
well as an emotional stake and often large financial interests in the business. Cowling (2003) 
argued that a founder provides valuable input into firm operations and holds a unique position 
in terms of power. Howton (2006) found that if the CEO is a founder, the corporation will 
outperform non-founder led corporations. Because the board is one of the most important 
governance mechanisms of the firm, having the founder among the board members should 
also be valuable to the firm and affect both underpricing and long-term aftermarket 
performance. The presence of the founder on the board should thus influence the corporation 
in similar ways as if he or she were the CEO of the corporation.  
Board tenure. The more time a member of the board has spent on one specific board the 
more knowledge he or she would have of the internal workings of the corporation. This 
would also result in increased knowledge about how to utilise this experience within the 
board in question. Previous findings by Howton (2006) have shown that longer tenure among 
board members (the average in her study being 7.38 years) is significantly related to firm 
survival. This is also supported by Crutchley et al. (2002) who found that board stability 
increases aftermarket performance.  
Employee representation. Employee representation on the board is found in, for instance, 
Germany, The Netherlands, Finland, and Scandinavian countries. In Sweden, legislation 
stating the right of employees to be a part of the board of corporations was passed as early as 
1973 (Levinson 2001). The motivation behind this legislation was to give the employees 
greater insights into the corporation as well as some influence over its operations. However, 
the effect on performance for those companies having employee representation on the board 
has, to the best of our knowledge, never been examined. Levinson (2001) asked Swedish 
managing directors and chairpersons about their view on employee representation. The 
majority (more than 65%) viewed employee representatives as a valuable resource for the 
corporation. The representatives are said to contribute to a positive co-operative climate and 
stronger support among employees for board decisions.  
Specific Experiences  
Managerial experience. The presence or non-presence on the board or in the top 
management team of someone with managerial experience is often discussed in conjunction 
with new ventures and SMEs. In smaller firms the board is often called upon to make up for 
the lack of managerial experience and expertise within the firm (Huse 1990; Daily & Dalton 
1992). Moy and Luk (2003) concluded that this shortage in experience among top managers 
is an obstacle for growth in SMEs. Because many firms going public for the first time are 
classified as SMEs the managerial experience among upper echelons could be an issue. Board 
members with CEO experience will have insights and knowledge about how to manage a 
firm as well as insights into certain industries. As with interlocking directorships, there may 





also be a valuable network to be utilised by the firm if board members are or have been CEOs 
of other firms.  
Director age. In labour research it has long been recognised that with age comes growing 
labour market experience resulting in a growth in earnings for the employing firm (Medoff & 
Abraham 1980). In addition, it has been suggested that older directors, besides experience, 
also provide wisdom, possibly economic resources (Kang et al. 2007), and a higher level of 
maturity and moral development (Daboub et al. 1995) than do younger directors. Muth and 
Donaldson (1998:8) argued that “boards of a higher average age may exhibit a conservative 
bias and better judgment. Therefore they may be more capable of thinking independently and 
more likely to control younger managers inclined to take risks at the expense of 
shareholders.” In support of these arguments Bodnaruk et al. (2008) found younger owners 
more eager to take their corporation public with the firms consequently more underpriced. 
Considering these arguments, the average age of directors should have an effect on 
aftermarket performance.  
Venture capitalist involvement. Venture capital firms specialise in co-investing equity with 
the entrepreneurs to fund high growth firms. Doing that implies that they need to not only 
contribute with growth capital, but also with the necessary competence to help the 
entrepreneurial firm to grow (Isaksson 2006). Hence, venture capitalists take an active role in 
the firms in which they invest (Fried & Hisrich 1995). They provide support and governance, 
for example, by active participation on the board of directors, acting as a sounding board, 
monitoring financial performance etcetera (Gorman & Sahlman 1989; Sapienza & Timmons 
1989; MacMillan et al. 1989; Ehrlich et al. 1994). Furthermore, Gabrielsson and Huse (2002) 
showed that boards in venture capital backed firms were more active than boards in other 
firms (for instance by higher frequency of meetings). 
An IPO is one of the most preferred exit mechanisms for venture capitalists (Cumming 
& MacIntosh 2002). Several studies have investigated how venture capital backed firms 
perform after an IPO or the issue of over or underpricing of shares at that time (Barry et al. 
1990; Megginson & Weiss 1991; Lerner 1994; Bruton et al. 2010). For example, Barry et al. 
(1990) investigated underpricing in connection with venture capitalists and found that due to 
the expertise and guidance provided by the venture capitalist the corporations were less 
underpriced than corporations not backed by a venture capitalist. They found that venture 
capital backed IPOs hired more distinguished underwriters and were introduced at lower 
Price/Earnings ratios. Lerner (1994) also examined the contribution venture capitalists made 
to the success of an IPO of the firms in their portfolios. While his study was limited to 350 
biotech companies, he found that venture capital backed companies usually made their IPO at 
higher market values than companies without venture capital backing. Brav and Gompers 
(1997) also showed that the specific experience possessed by venture capitalists have an 
effect on the performance of the corporation (in other words, that venture capital backed 
firms outperform non-venture capital backed firms due to the continued presence of venture 
capital firm representatives on the board). 
Hence, the managerial experience of venture capitalists as well as their experience of 
previous public listings indicates that there should be a positive effect on aftermarket 
performance in venture capital financed firms going public.  





Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, the total population of IPOs listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange (OMX) over a ten year period (January 1996–September 2006) was investigated. 
During this time period there were approximately 260 new listings on the OMX and of these 
approximately 130 were initial public offerings as described by OMX classifications. Basic 
information regarding these IPOs, such as listing price, date, industry sector and size of 
listing, was retrieved from the OMX. To learn more about these IPOs, prospectuses were 
collected either from the companies themselves, various underwriters, or public authorities. 
For this study it was possible to assess 94% of the prospectuses of IPOs that occurred during 
the time period selected for examination. The rest of the IPOs occurring in this period (6%) 
have been excluded due to changes in organisational form, such as buyouts, reorganisations, 
or mergers and acquisitions, which limited access to relevant material. Data regarding  
 
Table 1. Variables Description 
This Table contains descriptions of the variables used in the analysis. Column one gives the category of 
the variable as well as an extended name. The abbreviated name used in the analysis is given in column 
two, while the third column has a brief description of each variable. 
Dependent variables 
Underpricing BHARt Short term aftermarket performance. Level of underpricing, 
i.e., abnormal buy-and-hold return first day of trading. 
Adjusted by OMX industry indices.  
Long-run performance BHARm Long-run aftermarket performance. Abnormal buy-and-
hold return, twelve or twenty-four months after the first day 
of trading. Adjusted by OMX industry indices.  
Independent variables  
External ties and professionalism 
Interlocking directorships InLo Percentage of the board holding board positions at other 
firms.  
Intra-corporate experience 
Founder participation Found Dummy variable which equals one for companies where 
the founder is a member of the board, and zero otherwise. 
Average tenure Ten Average tenure of board members. 
Employee representation Empl Dummy variable which equals one if employee 
representatives are part of the board, and zero otherwise. 
Specific experience 
Managerial experience Man Percentage of the board being CEOs. 
Director age DAge Average age of board members. 
VC backing VC Dummy variable which equals one for companies that are 
backed by venture capitalists and zero otherwise. 
Control variables 
Board size BSize Number of directors on the board.  
Firm size FSize Dummy variable, which equals one if the firm is classified 
as an SME at the time of public listing, and zero otherwise. 
Firm age  FAge The difference between the offering date and the date of 
founding. 
Female participation Fem Dummy variable coded 1 if there are females present on the 
board and 0 otherwise.  
Director ownership DOwn Percentage of the board holding shares or options in the 
IPO firm. 
Underwriter reputation URep Market share, as lead underwriter, on the Swedish IPO 
market.  
Hot market Hot Dummy variable, which equals zero if the firm was taken 
public during the hot period up until year 2000, and one if 
taken public after the year 2000.  





accounting information were compiled from the prospectuses from the latest annual report at 
the time of the IPO. Any information available in the prospectuses regarding the experience 
of the directors was also compiled. 
In order to test the hypotheses, information regarding the daily stock price of each IPO 
up until twenty-four months after the listing was also collected from Thomson DataStream. 
Market adjustments of the returns were made using the OMX Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) sectoral indices. This information was retrieved directly from the Stock 
Exchange. Information on venture capitalists’ involvement was retrieved from the database of 
Förvärv & Fusioner AB, a well-respected agency conducting research on mergers and 
acquisitions in Sweden. This information was then matched with the database on IPOs 
created for this study.  
Variables 
A full list of the variables assessed as well as brief descriptions of each are given in Table 1. 
The independent variables, derived from section 3, are self-explanatory while the dependent 
variables as well as the control variables are described below. To adjust for skewness, and to 
accommodate the normality assumption on which regressions are built, natural logarithmic 
transformations were applied to several of the variables before analysis as indicated by “ln” 
before the variable name below in Table 3 and 4.  
Dependent Variables. To evaluate the aftermarket returns, three time periods were 
examined: underpricing and long-run aftermarket performance after twelve and twenty-four 
months, all measured as buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The measures utilised in this study 
are among the most common when examining aftermarket performance of IPOs (Certo et al. 
2009). Underpricing measures the extent to which the closing price at the first day of trading 
differs from the offer price. The level of underpricing has been market adjusted as proposed 
by Carter et al. (1998) and Certo et al. (2001b) and is calculated as the percentage increase 
from the offering price to the closing price on the first day of trading. Returns are then 
adjusted by subtracting the increase in OMX Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
sectoral indices during the same time period (for industry classes and indices see Appendix 







Pi,t is the closing price of the stock i on its first trading day, Pi,t-1 is its offering price, Si,t 
is the closing index (for the stock i sector), and Si,t-1 is the opening index for that trading day. 
Long-run aftermarket performance is calculated as abnormal buy-and-hold returns after the 
first day of trading, and is measured over twelve (m=12) and twenty-four (m=24) months 
after the IPO.4 Using two different time periods when measuring long-run performance 
enables examination of time-varying performance patterns. Hence, the abnormal long-run 
aftermarket performance (BHARm), over either twelve or twenty-four months, for stock i is 
calculated using the same general pattern as above, where:  
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Pi,t+m is the closing price of stock i after twelve or twenty-four months, Pi,t is the closing price 
of stock i day one. By using the closing price from day one underpricing is excluded from the 
measure as is done in most studies on long-run performance of IPOs (Loughran & Ritter 
1995). Si,t+m is the closing price of the GICS index for industry i after twelve or twenty-four 
months, and Si,t is the closing price of the index for the first trading day of the stock. It is also 
common to adjust returns using benchmark firms, as described in Loughran and Ritter 
(1995). However, as argued by Brav and Gompers (1997), market adjustment using industry 
indices avoids the possible bias caused by firm specific events in benchmark firms while 
consideration is given to events that have an effect on the returns of an entire industry.  
The dependent variables included some extreme observations. In order to neutralise the 
effect of these outliers in the continuing analysis the sample was Winsorized (Tukey 1962; 
Armstrong 2001; Jose & Winkler 2007). The most extreme observations (two percent highest 
and lowest values) were replaced by the nearest unaffected values. As argued by Tukey 
(1962) this method is preferable to trimming of data since that would reduce the efficiency of 
the analysis, especially when outliers are not the result of data collection or sampling errors. 
Control Variables. Previous researchers have found that a number of governance variables, 
other than those mentioned above, influence firm performance. These variables include board 
size, director ownership in the firm, gender diversity (female directors present on the board), 
underwriter reputation, firm age and size and year of introduction. All are also included in 
this analysis. Various scholars (Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al. 1998; Certo et al. 2001a; 
Howton et al. 2001) have investigated board size and its influence on performance. Their 
results have been inconclusive. Firm size and age also have a reported relationship to firm 
performance (Jain & Kini 1994; Ritter 1998; Bhabra & Pettway 2003). For instance, Bhabra 
and Pettway (2003) have found that the underperformance of IPO firms in relation to already 
listed firms is more severe for smaller and younger firms. In this research, firm size is 
measured through a dummy coded 0 for large firms and 1 for small and middle-sized firms as 
defined by European Union classifications.5 Age of the firm is measured as the difference 
between the offering date and the date of founding. 
Sweden has, during the last decade, been under pressure to increase female participation 
in managerial and board positions. Boards in Sweden have become more gender diverse 
during the last couple of years (Thorsell & Cornelius, 2009). It is expected that greater gender 
diversity will broaden the available pool of director talent and thus increase board 
effectiveness (Higgs 2003). Due to the marginal number of female directors during the period 
examined (only 6%) the influence of female participation is tested using a dummy variable 
coded 0 if there are no females on the board and 1 otherwise.  
Research on governance has been focused largely on the incentives of board and 
management to work in the interest of shareholders. Directors are given incentives, through 
share holdings or options in the company, in order to align their interests with those of 
shareholders. This is meant to encourage them to work more effectively toward better market 
performance (Howton et al. 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop 2002). The percentage of directors 
holding shares or options (or both) in the corporation has therefore been added as a control 
variable.  
The reputation of the lead underwriter may also impact the investors’ valuation of the 
firm (Carter et al. 1998; Howton 2006). Future business for underwriters is largely based on 
the success of previous undertakings. It is thus in the best interest of the underwriters that the 
IPOs they manage are successful. Underwriters do, in addition, possess valuable experience 
                                                 
5 Within the EU, SMEs are defined as corporations with 10-249 employees and an annual turnover not 
exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million (The 
Commission of the European Communities 2003).  





based on taking part in several previous IPOs. Underwriter reputation is based on market 
share as primary underwriter in the Swedish IPO market. This approach is similar to that 
employed by Megginson and Weiss (1991:890) who assumed that “the greater the average 
market share of the lead underwriters, the higher is the quality”. Market share can be 
calculated either through the percentage of the value of the shares being introduced on the 
market or the actual number of IPOs. The value offered to the market by each firm has not 
been calculated in the same way for the IPOs in our study. Therefore, the percentage number 
of IPOs brought to the market is used to calculate the market share, as in Bodnaruk et al. 
(2008).  
The level of underpricing has proven to be higher in hot markets (Florin & Simsek 
2007), thus making the year of introduction important. The Swedish market experienced such 
a period, as did most western markets, during the late 1990’s until the so-called IT-bubble 
collapsed in 2000. A dummy has thus been created coded 1 for the more pessimistic market 
environment following the burst of the IT-bubble in 2000 and 0 for the bull-market years 
leading up to this event (1996-2000).  
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Table 3 contains a correlation matrix of all 
analysed variables. The descriptive statistics show that the average underpricing in the 
Swedish IPO market is quite large; 15% for the first day of trading. This result is similar to 
that of previous research on underpricing (Ritter 1991) and almost identical to previous 
studies of Swedish IPOs: Schuster (2003) reported 18.5% and in Bodnaruk et al. (2008) 
reported 14.2%. After the first day of trading, the IPO firms included in this study on average 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
This Table contains descriptive statistics for the assessed dependent and independent variables (before 
natural logarithmic transformations). The mean, standard deviation, minimum, median and maximum of 
the dependent, independent and control variables are reported. For dummy variables further descriptive 
statistics are provided in Appendix B. 
Variables Mean SD Minimum Median Max 
 
Dependent variables 
BHARt 0.150 0.309 -0.213 0.070 2.404 
BHAR12  0.193 1.530 -2.177 -0.101 10.852 
BHAR24  0.008 1.054 -3.056 -0.106 4.549 
 
Independent variables 
InLo 73.575 22.071 0.000 80.000 100.000 
Found 0.517 0.502 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Ten 3.888 2.644 0.000 3.330 12.400 
Empl 0.310 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Man 48.783 23.246 0.000 50.000 100.000 
DAge 50.845 4.403 38.670 51.430 60.800 
VC 0.431 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Control variables 
BSize 5.877 1.125 3.000 6.000 9.000 
FSize 0.575 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FAge 29.016 32.615 1.000 13.000 147.000 
Fem 0.240 0.429 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DOwn 64.466 33.411 0.000 71.400 100.000 
UWRep 0.162 0.092 0.008 0.171 0.285 




Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
This Table contains the Pearson correlation for all analysed variables. *p ≤ .10;  **p ≤ .05;  ***p ≤ .01 (2-tailed) 
 BHARt BHAR12 BHAR24 InLo Found lnTen Empl lnMan lnDAge VC lnBSize lnFAge Fem DOwn lnUWRep Hot
BHARt 1   
BHAR12 0.055 1  
    
BHAR24 0.142 0.688 1  
  ***  
InLo -0.177 0.045 -0.029 1  
 **   
Found 0.114 -0.107 -0.138 -0.137 1  
    
lnTen 0.119 0.135 0.166 -0.120 0.093 1  
   *  
Empl 0.024 0.047 0.158 -0.119 -0.170 0.140 1  
   *  
lnMan 0.041 -0.051 -0.081 0.031 0.115 -0.071 0.033 1  
    
lnDAge -0.042 0.070 0.140 0.068 -0.147 0.190 0.124 -0.090 1  
   **  
VC 0.011 0.022 -0.009 0.126 0.125 0.010 0.024 0.065 -0.035 1 
    
lnBSize -0.011 0.041 0.043 0.012 -0.209 0.076 0.581 0.106 0.102 0.149 1
   ** *** * 
lnFAge -0.120 0.176 0.176 0.026 -0.430 0.270 0.302 -0.020 0.289 -0.049 0.257 1
  * * *** *** *** ***  ***
Fem 0.002 0.018 0.026 -0.109 -0.118 -0.042 -0.005 0.106 0.041 -0.096 0.194 0.260 1
    ** ***
DOwn 0.156 -0.049 -0.183 -0.107 0.412 0.091 -0.185 -0.026 -0.128 0.024 -0.252 -0.371 -0.168 1
 *  * *** **  *** *** *
lnUWRe
p 
0.072 0.157 0.088 0.333 0.030 0.015 -0.051 0.129 0.177 -0.026 0.145 -0.069 -0.024 0.059 1
  * *** *  
Hot -0.176 0.056 0.009 0.145 -0.103 0.038 -0.042 0.092 0.068 0.194 0.233 0.103 0.388 -0.079 0.191 1




outperformed the market by 19% in the first year followed by a year of modest aftermarket 
performance (0.8%). It can also be seen, that the underperformers are increasingly 
underperforming over time while the firms with the largest growth in market value have 
peaked at twelve months. In contrast with previous findings in Anglo-American research 
(Ritter 1991) the IPO firms in this study have not underperformed the market on average 
during this period of time. Previous studies using Swedish data have given similar results to 
ours (Loughran et al. 1994, Schuster, 2003). In fact, Loughran et al. (1994) reported long-run 
aftermarket over-performance by Swedish listed corporations.  
It is shown, in Table 2, that on average, 70% of the directors included in the study held 
interlocking directorships while almost 50% had managerial experience. On average a 
director in a Swedish IPO firm is male and 51 years old, 43% of the firms in the sample are 
backed by venture capitalists, and 50% have a founder that is a member of the board. Even 
though employees are legally encouraged to participate in board activities, only 30% of the 
firms have boards with employee representation.  
Descriptive statistics on control variables show that IPOs in hot markets are 
overrepresented by 82% of the firms during the period sampled. When it comes to size the 
firms are a bit more evenly distributed with 69% classified as small or middle-sized. The 
firms are on average surprisingly old, 29 years. However, this number appears to be 
influenced by a small number of older firms, particularly one that is 147 years old; the 
median is substantially lower at 13 years. As previously indicated the number of females on 
Swedish IPO boards is low and only 24% of the firms have a board with at least one female 
director. Director ownership and/or stock options given to directors appear to be very 
common. The boards consist of 6 members on average (6.5 when personnel representatives 
are included).   
Results 
The relationship between various measures of board experience and the aftermarket 
performance of the IPO firm has been tested through OLS regressions. Each dependent 
variable, underpricing and long-run aftermarket performance (twelve or twenty-four months) 
have been tested individually through the following general form: 
 
ininii xxBHAR   ....11  
 
Where BHARi is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for stock i, α is the constant and ε the 
error term. β1 through βn are the estimated coefficients for each independent and control 
variable; x1 through xn. Outliers were removed based on standardized residuals. 
By the Pearson correlations (2-tailed) reported in Table 3 it is evident that there may be 
some collinearity between several of the independent variables as well as the control 
variables. As a consequence multicollinearity diagnostics were calculated. The highest 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was 2.0 for board size, which is well below the threshold value 
of 10. These results indicate that the levels of multicollinearity are insignificant.  
Underpricing 
The estimated coefficients shown in Table 4 indicate that only two of the measures of 
director experience have a significant effect on the level of underpricing of Swedish IPOs; 
interlocking directorships and average tenure. The higher the percentage of board members 
with interlocking directorships the lower the underpricing among those firms examined. This 
  





Table 4. Effects of Director Experience on Underpricing and Long-Term Performance 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression. Coefficients are standardized beta estimates. All 
regressions contain an unreported constant. T-values are given in brackets. “ln” before the variable name 
indicates where natural logarithmic transformations have been applied. 
*p ≤ 0,10;  **p ≤ 0,05;  ***p ≤ 0,01 
 BHARt BHAR12 BHAR24 
Independent variables       
InLo -0.23 ** 0.02  -0.05  
 (-2.11)  (0.21)  (-0.38)  
Found -0.05  -0.12  -0.13  
 (-0.44)  (-0.90) (-0.89)  
lnTen 0.24 ** 0.30 ** 0.21  
 (2.05)  (2.39)  (1.43)  
Empl -0.02  -0.03  0.11  
 (-0.13)  (-0.25)  (0.72)  
lnMan 0.05  -0.05  -0.07  
 (0.50) (-0.43) (-0.57) 
lnDAge -0.08  -0.14  -0.07  
 (-0.77) (-1.24)  (-0.52)  
VC -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 
 (-0.92)  (-0.17)  (-0.34)  
Control variables       
lnBSize 0.17  0.04  -0.11  
 (1.34)  (0.31)  (-0.69)  
FSize -0.02  0.08  -0.05  
 (-0.17)  (0.59)  (-0.33)  
lnFAge -0.06  0.11  0.01  
 (-0.49)  (0.80)  (0.07)  
Fem 0.14  -0.09  0.06  
 (1.22)  (-0.76)  (0.44)  
DOwn 0.10  -0.14  -0.16  
 (0.86)  (-1.17)  (-1.22)  
lnUWRep 0.21 * 0.08  0.14  
 (1.93) (0.63) (1.06) 
Hot   -0.25 ** 0.04  -0.03  
 (-2.21)  (0.31)  (-0.21)  
Adjusted R2 0.10  0.00  0.00 
 
is consistent with the findings of Certo et al. (2001a). Thus, selecting board members with 
interlocking directorships will reduce underpricing among the IPOs who employ them. As a 
result, less money is left on the table and the corporation will be priced more fairly. An 
alternative explanation, however, for the lower underpricing associated with interlocking 
directorships may lie in an actual decrease in the value of the firm itself. The Swedish media 
has repeatedly reported that directors hold too many board seats leaving them with too little 
time to do a good job as directors in each firm (e.g. Danielsson 1999 and the large debate 
covered in Swedish media in 2009 over the numerous board seats occupied by Wanja Lundby 
Vedin, the head of the largest union in Sweden). If this is also the view of investors, they 
would place less value on a firm if many directors held a large number of interlocking 
directorships due to the time constraints this would place on the directors’ abilities to perform 





their tasks satisfactorily. One sign that this fear exists can be found in the Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance (2004:130, section 3.3) that states that each board member should not 
have “so many other duties that he or she is unable to devote the necessary time and care to 
the company’s board work”. If investors interpret interlocking directorships negatively as 
something that decreases the value of the firm a lower value would be set on it and, as a 
consequence there would be less room for the price to rise on the first day of trading.  
Tenure is positively related to underpricing. This suggests that a stable board with longer 
average tenure is appreciated by first day investors but it does not reduce the extent of 
underpricing. Firms preparing for an IPO often restructure the board, given the need to meet 
listing regulations, but new directors are also recruited out of a wish to “professionalise” the 
board and to signal quality. These results suggest that such attempts are successful.   
Only underwriter reputation and the “hot market” dummy were found to be significant 
in terms of the control variables’ relationship with the level of underpricing. Larger degrees 
of underpricing were associated with hot markets and higher underwriter reputation. The 
model predicting the level of underpricing had a low R-square value (.10). It is evident that 
more factors influencing underpricing must still be added to the analysis. 
Long-Run Performance 
The regressions testing for a relationship between director experience and long-run 
aftermarket performance in twelve and twenty-four months are presented in Table 4, both 
produced an R-square value of zero. This suggests that the variables entered into the model 
have no explanatory power. Through backward regression tenure was found to have a highly 
significant positive relation to twelve months long-run performance but the model still 
produced a bad fit (R-square .05). The same analysis was undertaken for the twenty-four 
months long-run performance with similar results. R-square was also .05, while founder 
participation (a negative relationship) and tenure (a positive relationship) was found to be 
significant.  
Because the lack of evidence of significant relationships between the independent 
variables and most of the dependent variables could be due to the statistical model applied, 
alternate statistical models were tried. Firstly, the OLS regression was expanded through the 
use of various interaction variables. This gave similar results to the regressions reported 
herein. Secondly, the changes in the dependent variable are, although significant, sometimes 
small. Therefore, it was believed that an ANOVA, or chi-square analysis, with the dependent 
variables used to classify the firms into groups of high or low aftermarket performance might 
be able to shed some light upon possible undetected relationships. Once again, however, the 
analysis offered similar results. Thus, the lack of significant relationships between 
investigated variables in this environment seems to be confirmed.  
Conclusions 
Previous research has been extended, in this study, through the testing of a large set of 
variables connected to director experience and included in a single model. Variables such as 
interlocking directorships and director age have previously been tested in conjunction with 
underpricing or long-run aftermarket performance but not both. Several of the variables 
(employee representation and founder and CEO participation) have, to the best of our 
knowledge, not been tested before in connection with aftermarket performance. This study 
has also extended the work of previous researchers in two ways given the empirical 
environment examined. That is, the Swedish governance paradigm is unique, combining both 
the stakeholder and shareholder models, and the market is dominated by a large portion of 





SMEs. Governance in SMEs has been a neglected topic for many years even though the value 
of a carefully selected board is said to be even higher among them (Daily et al. 2002).  
Although minor similarities can be found, overall the results presented herein fail to 
support previous research. Certain aspects of director experience (interlocking directorships 
and average tenure) are found to be related to underpricing as they did in previous research. 
However, our results are not very strong, perhaps due to the small number of firms included 
in the study (122 firms) or the time period examined. In addition, none of the variables were 
found to have any explanatory power in terms of long-run aftermarket performance. 
Nevertheless, the lack of a significant relationship between director experience and long-run 
performance potentially has interesting implications. One reason for the lack of support of the 
stated hypotheses could be that smaller and larger markets react differently to governance 
signals. There could also be cultural differences that affect investors’ valuation of certain 
governance characteristics. 
As stated by Ho and Williams (2003:465), “under different socio-political and economic 
conditions, governance needs vary”. Similar results were also found by Bruton et al. (2010). 
This highlights the need to evaluate both governance and aftermarket performance under 
different institutional contexts. In addition, measures of experience, other than those 
examined herein, may be valued more highly by Swedish investors at the time of an IPO than 
by Anglo-American investors, further emphasising differences caused by a diverse 
institutional environment. These would then have a greater influence on firm value and 
performance. Furthermore, the Swedish context, as discussed previously, includes regulations 
and guidelines that forces firms to comply with best practices of corporate governance, 
leading to more homogeneous boards where all contain independent directors, directors with 
IPO experience, etcetera. In order to create value above what the rest are doing, other 
contributions made by directors should be considered. Hence, further expansion of the 
concept of director experience is still required, especially for non-Anglo-American markets 
and smaller markets. 
Another alternative explanation for the lack of significant relationships between director 
experience and long-run aftermarket performance may lie in one of the most familiar 
concepts in finance; the efficient market hypothesis. The board of directors is an observable 
signal at the time of the IPO. As argued under the efficient market hypothesis, all available 
information should be included immediately in the value of the stock. If the market is 
efficient, prices should adjust without delay to any new information. The share price reflects 
investors’ expectations of future cash flows, and because the quality of the board is expected 
to influence future cash flows, and hence firm performance either directly or indirectly, this 
should be incorporated into the share price as soon as information regarding the board of 
directors becomes available. The IPO represents a unique situation because all information is 
usually provided well before trading starts and even though some market forces are usually 
involved when setting the offer price, the offer price is not set on an open market. In an 
efficient market any adjustments in the offer price due to board characteristics are made on 
the first day of trading. This would explain why a small effect of director experience can be 
seen on the level of underpricing while long-run performance remains unaffected. If this is 
the case, future studies on board and performance should focus on other measures of 
performance, for example market-to-book value. In addition, institutional differences in the 
pricing process per se could also result in differences in the aftermarket performance of IPOs.  
Further research into aspects of governance that could be undertaken includes either a 
survey or interview approach to the experience and attitudes of directors. This would allow 
researchers to obtain a deeper understanding of issues related to board effectiveness and to 
further distinguish between process and structure. Similar ideas were put forward by 
Gabrielsson (2007) who found traditional board demographic measures unable to explain 





variations in CEO commitment to entrepreneurial posture. Replications of governance studies 
undertaken elsewhere could include a further expansion of governance concepts distilled 
from new empirical environments such as unregulated stock lists. As highlighted above, the 
institutional context seems to be influencing the importance of certain characteristics of 
director experience in terms of their value and effect on aftermarket performance. Thus, 
further examination of director experience and aftermarket performance in different 
institutional contexts is required to evaluate this influence, especially because markets today 
are changing and there are signs of a convergence towards a unified model of corporate 
governance including both stakeholder and shareholder perspectives. This has been 
particularly visible in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  
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